

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.144
14 June 1963
ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

AUG 26 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 14 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

63-16176

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. V. ISMIRLIEV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. Z. SEINER
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. JALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. S.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. CBI

Poland:

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSSHCHIN

Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY

Mr. V.A. SEMENOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURLIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and forty-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): An important task entrusted to our Committee is that of discussing and adopting measures which, without representing an integrant part of general and complete disarmament, should nevertheless be conducive to the lessening of international tension, should promote and consolidate confidence in relations between States, and by those means should facilitate the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

Our Committee already has before it a number of proposals designed to open up prospects for speedy implementation of that objective and to allow fruitful developments. I have in mind the proposals aiming at the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATC and the States signatories to the Warsaw Treaty (ENDC/77), the adoption of a declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), and the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the globe.

Today I propose to give expression to certain considerations by the Romanian delegation concerning that last issue -- that is, the creation of nuclear-free zones. The idea of nuclear-free zones is of comparatively recent date. It originated and acquired a definite shape in the 'fifties of this century, representing in a certain sense, one might say, a development and an adaptation to the conditions of the second half of the twentieth century of an older institution of international law -- namely, that of demilitarized territories. It is an idea which gives expression to the ardent desire of the peoples -- in the very specific conditions of the existence of the most destructive weapons known so far -- that efficient measures be taken against the greatest danger hovering over humanity: that of a devastating nuclear war.

Answering the compelling necessity of our times, the idea of nuclear-free zones has continuously gained scope, conquering the minds and the hearts of people everywhere. It has been adopted by numerous governments, and has become an object of major concern in the United Nations as well as in other international bodies. It is on the agenda of our Conference (ENDC/C.1/2). Numerous proposals aiming at the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world -- in Europe, in the Pacific area, in Africa, in Latin America -- testify to the viability of this idea. Recent developments and proposals, whose echo has made itself felt in this Committee too, give fresh and eloquent proof.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The delegation of the Polish People's Republic has re-stated during the current session of our Conference the well-known proposal of the Polish Government with regard to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1).

On 6 May 1963 (ENDC/PV.128) the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, and the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, submitted to this Conference the Declaration (ENDC/87) signed by the Presidents of five Latin-American countries -- Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico -- aimed at turning the Latin-American continent into a nuclear-free zone.

The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, expounded before the Committee (ENDC/PV.137, pp.9 et seq.) the contents of the Soviet proposal (ENDC/91) of 20 May on the denuclearization of the Mediterranean region.

Just a few days ago, on 10 June, the representatives of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic submitted to us (ENDC/PV.142) the resolution on general and complete disarmament passed by the African Summit Conference at Addis Ababa. In that important document the heads of thirty independent African States declared that they decided --

"1. To affirm and respect the principle of declaring Africa a Denuclearized Zone; to oppose all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, as well as the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy". (ENDC/93/Rev.1, p.1)

This represents a new and significant development in the direction of the implementation of resolution 1652 (XVI) concerning the consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 24 November 1961.

Opinions have been voiced here on other valuable initiatives too. Among those I may mention the statement made on 28 May by the President of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen, with regard to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia (see ENDC/PV.141, p. 20).

While reviewing those proposals -- which not only have the character of mere proposals but are explicit demands -- and recalling how the idea of nuclear-free zones was met some years ago by the Western nuclear Powers, I am tempted to repeat here the words of Galileo Galilei: "Eppur si muove!" Indeed the idea is moving on; it is going ahead, and, like every great idea which has originated in reality, it takes hold of the masses and thus acquires strength.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

How are we to explain the powerful support the idea of nuclear-free zones is enjoying? What are the reasons for which peoples and governments representing countries, broad geographical regions, entire continents, are taking a stand in favour of nuclear-free zones? The answer to these questions is a simple one. The massive support given to the idea of nuclear-free zones stems from the conviction that the implementation of such measures would represent an important step towards the elimination of nuclear danger. The safest and the most efficient way to achieve the ultimate elimination of that danger and to secure international peace and security is the implementation of general and complete disarmament. But it is clear that the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the globe would represent an important step in the right direction -- the direction of reducing the nuclear danger, of lessening international tension, and of promoting confidence and co-operation between States.

In fact and de jure, a nuclear-free zone represents a region from which or upon which no blow will be dealt with nuclear weapons, a region where the nuclear weapon will be banned -- that is, its use as well as its production, acquisition, storing, stock-piling and testing. Thus a valuable contribution would be made, not only to the strengthening of the security of States situated in the particular region, but also to strengthening and ensuring world peace. In short, to conclude agreements for the creation of nuclear-free zones means to work for peace.

Proceeding from the belief that all States, whether big or small, are in duty bound to make their entire contribution to the strengthening of peace, the Government of the Romanian People's Republic addressed to the governments of the Balkan countries in 1957 and 1959 proposals designed to turn the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation, free of nuclear weapons and rockets. May I be allowed to recall briefly the essence of the Romanian Government's proposals?

On 10 September 1957, addressing himself to the Governments of the Balkan States, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People's Republic proposed the convening of a conference of the heads of government of the Balkan States, which --

"... might examine and take adequate decisions on problems concerning the strengthening of peace in the Balkans, non-aggression, the settlement of any litigious issue by peaceful means, development of economic and cultural relations as well as personal contacts between the leaders of the countries of South-East Europe, the exchange of delegations, mutual visits, the broadening of contacts between the representatives of public opinion, and so on."

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

In order to give this co-operation a more lasting character, the Romanian Government proposed --

"The implementation of a collective agreement of the Balkan States with a view to ensuring peace in this region for the prosperity and progress of the Balkan peoples. The Balkan entente must be founded on complete equality of rights between the participating States, on mutual respect for their sovereignty, and on non-interference with their internal affairs."

Reaffirming the unwavering desire of the Romanian people and its Government to live in peace and friendship with the other Balkan peoples, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People's Republic stated on 29 December 1957 before the Grand National Assembly:

"It is known that in the past the Balkans were named 'the gunpowder barrel'. Today, when gunpowder has long been out-dated, the question arises: What is best, to set up launching pads for atomic weapons pointed against each other, or to create conditions for the development of peaceful co-operation between the countries in this part of Europe in the interest of their economic progress and of improving the life of their peoples? In so far as the Romanian Government is concerned, it will continue its efforts for the strengthening of peace and understanding in the Balkans, and expresses its conviction that its endeavours will enjoy the support of all Balkan States in the interest of its peoples and the cause of peace."

In the declaration of the Government of the Romanian People's Republic of 26 January 1959 concerning the conclusion of a military agreement between Turkey and the United States of America, we read inter alia:

"Instead of nuclear armaments, instead of the emplacement of launching pads for guided weapons, instead of stepping up military preparations, the Government of the Romanian People's Republic proposed the many-sided co-operation between Turkey and the Romanian People's Republic, the development of trade and cultural exchanges, friendship between the Romanian and the Turkish people and between all the Balkan peoples."

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

On 6 June 1959 the Government of the Romanian People's Republic issued a declaration in which, reaffirming its proposals of 1957, it stated that --

"The Romanian Government believes that the danger of a generalized nuclear war would be significantly diminished and the peace and security of the peoples in the Balkan area would be efficiently safeguarded if common efforts were made by all the Balkan States leading to the elimination from this region of foreign military forces equipped with nuclear armaments, rocket-launching pads and guided missiles."

In that declaration the proposal was also made to adopt a treaty of understanding and collective security on the strength of which --

"... the Balkan States would undertake to settle by peaceful means any litigious issue, to refrain from resorting to aggression or threats of war in their mutual relations, and would undertake not to admit the stockpiling of atomic and nuclear armaments or the stationing of military units equipped with atomic and nuclear arms belonging to States alien to the Balkan region, or the emplacement of rocket-launching pads and of guided missiles on their territory."

The proposals of the Romanian People's Republic concerning the Balkans met with a huge response.

The Soviet Union, a nuclear Power, supported the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. In the statement of the Government of the Soviet Union of 25 June 1959 concerning the problem of ensuring peace in the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea area, we read inter alia:

"The Soviet Government highly appreciates the efforts of the governments of those countries which are standing up firmly and consistently for the strengthening of peace and for the broadest possible co-operation between the Balkan peoples on the basis of the principles of equal rights, mutual respect and non-interference with each other's internal affairs."

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

"In this connexion it is necessary to emphasize the declaration of the Romanian Government of 6 June this year [1959] in which it is once more proposed to convene a conference of the heads of government of the countries in the Balkan peninsula for the examination of the present-day issues which concern the countries of the area, including the examination of the proposal to create a zone of peace in the Balkans in which no atomic weapons or rocket weapons should exist."

Unfortunately one cannot say the same about the Western Powers, and especially about the United States of America, which did not support the idea of denuclearizing the Balkan region. On the contrary, those Powers have acted in a direction which endangers the security of the States in that part of the world also.

The proposals of the Romanian Government to create in the Balkans a zone of peace and co-operation, free of rockets and nuclear weapons, fully preserve their topical significance. On the occasion of the recent visit to Romania of the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant, the President of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, stated:

"The turning of the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation, free of nuclear weapons and rockets, would be in the interest of all the peoples in this geographical region and would constitute a significant contribution towards an international détente".

Shortly after that, in the message addressed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People's Republic, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, to the meeting of the representatives of the Committees for Balkan Co-operation which took place between 27 and 29 May 1963 in Bucharest, it is stated:

"The response given to the proposals of the Romanian Government as well as to those of other governments which pursue the creation of zones of peace, free of nuclear weapons, in various regions of the globe, entitles us to believe that the idea of nuclear-free zones is meeting the peoples' desire for international détente, rapprochement and understanding."

The proposal to set up a zone of peace and co-operation in the Balkans, free of nuclear weapons and missiles, represents one link in a chain of measures aimed at creating a vast denuclearized zone in Europe.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The previous proposals have been recently amplified by a new initiative. I have in mind the initiative of the Government of the Soviet Union regarding the denuclearization of the Mediterranean region (ENDC/91). This proposal is part and parcel of the continuous and persevering efforts of the Soviet Union aimed at safeguarding international peace and security. In the conditions of the denuclearization of the Mediterranean region, the peoples of that zone, Europeans and Africans, not only would be insured against the nuclear danger but would be also in a position to devote even more effort and means to the solution of their social and economic problems. At the same time this measure would contribute to the lessening of international tension, would support, as a pendant, the idea of denuclearizing Africa, and would enhance the chances of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Now a few remarks about the criteria which, in the opinion of some Western representatives, ought to be met by any proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone. It was, I dare submit, specifically the United Kingdom delegation which dwelt on this particular subject. At the meeting of 7 June the representative of the United Kingdom stated that any proposal regarding the creation of nuclear-free zones must comply with certain criteria. He mentioned the following criteria:

"First, such a proposal must have the support of the States directly concerned whose interests would be affected ...

"Secondly, we contend that such a proposal cannot be applied to an area of direct military confrontation of the great Powers.

"Thirdly, we say that it cannot be applied to regions where there is a complex system of essential defensive arrangements, such as those obtaining in Europe, which, pending general and complete disarmament, maintain the balance of power and thereby contribute to the preservation of peace".

(ENDC/PV.141, p. 16)

We of the Romanian delegation have no objection against guiding criteria, and that irrespectively of whether the issue at stake concerns the problem of denuclearized zones or any other problem submitted to this Committee -- but on one condition alone: that here, too, we should have a criterion, the criterion of objectiveness. In short, we are to establish objective criteria, and not subjective ones, criteria tending to promote real and effective proposals and not to torpedo them. The criteria put forward by Sir Paul Mason do not meet this criterion.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Let us take the first criterion given by the representative of the United Kingdom: that a proposal for a nuclear-free zone "must have the support of the States directly concerned whose interests would be affected". If the representative of the United Kingdom has in mind the freely-expressed consent of States which are situated in the particular geographical zone, we cannot but agree with him. Any agreement between two or more States is not conceivable in the absence of the freely-expressed consent of the States concerned. This stems from the very essence of contemporary international law, that law whose norms are meant to govern the relations between sovereign States, between States equal in sovereignty.

But when Sir Paul Mason tells us about the support "of the States directly concerned whose interests would be affected", things get a somewhat different connotation. Those words can be invoked by the Western nuclear Powers against any proposal to create a nuclear-free zone, in order to frustrate it. Why? Because, with regard to any geographical zone which we may want to denuclearize, the United States, the United Kingdom and France could proclaim themselves "States directly concerned whose interests are affected". In this case, knowing the stand of those Powers on the idea of denuclearized zones, every effort, in any area, would be thwarted. But perhaps I fail to make out the meaning of the words uttered by the representative of the United Kingdom. If that be the case, I should be only too grateful for any clarification he might deem fit to give us.

The second criterion put forward by the United Kingdom delegation appears to us equally unfounded. According to this, any proposal for a nuclear-free zone "cannot be applied to an area of direct military confrontation of the great Powers". With regard to this criterion one can submit, inter alia, the following remarks.

The above-quoted assessment reveals an obsolete concept of the character of inter-State relations in our era, a concept which could be applied in the centuries gone by which were characterized by the inequality governing inter-State relationships. "Direct military confrontation of great Powers" might be very easily invoked by the Western Powers in order to bring to naught the agreement reached by the States of a certain region to turn that particular region into a nuclear-free zone. Let us take an example. Suppose that the Balkan States reached agreement on the denuclearization of the Balkans. The United States or the United Kingdom might well claim that to be an area of direct military confrontation of great Powers, and thus torpedo the agreement. And that is true for any other region of the world.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Here I should like to make a point. The role of the great Powers in ensuring international peace and security is unanimously acknowledged. A tout seigneur tout honneur. But their interests, or rather the so-called interests of certain great Powers, cannot be set up against the right to peace and security of the other States. On the contrary, the great Powers have the right and the duty to act in the direction of ensuring international peace and security for all States, including those outside the category of great Powers. In the case of nuclear-free zones, the great Powers, the nuclear Powers, are called upon to play an important role. It is incumbent upon them to guarantee the status of nuclear-free zones established by the common consent of the States situated in the respective regions. It is in that direction that they are called upon to make a substantive contribution. But up to the present one nuclear Power alone, the Soviet Union, has made the offer to guarantee various proposals for nuclear-free zones. With regard to the United Kingdom in its capacity as a great Power, a nuclear Power, we do not know of such an offer. And the same is true of the United States.

With regard to the third criterion voiced by the United Kingdom delegation, namely that a proposal for establishing a nuclear-free zone "cannot be applied to regions where there is a complex system of essential defensive arrangements, such as those obtaining in Europe ...", such a criterion tends to destroy the very content of the idea of nuclear-free zones. Obviously it is highly desirable and praiseworthy to establish nuclear-free zones in those regions of the world in which, to use Sir Paul Mason's own wording, there is no "complex system of essential defensive arrangements". If the States situated in a region in which, at present, there are no nuclear weapons or their delivery vehicles do agree to turn that region into a nuclear-free zone, that can only be in the interest of peace.

But if the creation of nuclear-free zones is useful in the regions in which there are no nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-free zones appears even more useful in those parts of the globe where there are, at present, nuclear weapons and where, so to say, "there is a complex system of essential defensive arrangements". It is the idea from which the representative of Ethiopia also proceeded when on 6 May, referring to the statement made by the Presidents of the five Latin-American republics aimed at turning Latin America into a nuclear-free zone, he said:

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

"Also, our delegation ventures to hope that the example of this Declaration will be followed by other governments, especially in certain sensitive areas where nuclear weapons already exist" (ENDC/PV.128, p.23)

I stress the words "especially in certain sensitive areas where nuclear weapons already exist".

As to the reference the representative of the United Kingdom made to Europe, we take a fundamentally different stand. Within the space of only 25 years, two devastating wars have ravaged old Europe. The main battle-fields were in Europe. Millions of people belonging to the European nations have perished. Tremendous material and spiritual values have been destroyed -- values created in the course of many centuries by the toil of many generations. Europe has bled and has suffered too much for us to fail to focus our attention on it.

The situation now obtaining in Europe -- a situation loaded with tension -- and the existence of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles in a number of European countries plead precisely in favour of the adoption of proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in this continent which history has so sorely tried. The implementation of those proposals would result in substantially diminishing the danger of nuclear war; it would reduce tension and promote confidence in relations between the States of Europe. Thus an essential contribution would be made to the strengthening of peace, not only in Europe but also all over the world.

Before ending my statement I should like to make a final remark on the stand of the United Kingdom delegation in regard to the proposals aiming at the denuclearization of Latin America and of the African continent.

At our meetings of 6 May (ENDC/PV.128) and 7 June (ENDC/PV.141) the United Kingdom delegation told us of the favourable attitude of the United Kingdom with regard to those proposals. Referring specifically to Africa, the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Godber, made the following statement:

"We adopt in relation to Africa exactly the same attitude I have indicated in relation to Latin America. We have said so in the past. If the countries concerned really want this, then we shall adopt a very sympathetic interest towards it". (ENDC/PV.128, p.25).

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

That is a significant statement to which we of the Romanian delegation give all due attention. Why? Because it earmarks a change in the stand of the United Kingdom with regard to the idea of denuclearizing Africa. We are glad, of course, to note that this change has taken place in the right direction. In the past the British Government had a "slightly" different attitude. And while Mr. Godber states: "We have said so in the past", we should like to remind him of the following statement made by Sir Michael Wright before the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 November 1961. At that time Sir Michael Wright said:

"... we do not believe that the aim of the sponsors to 'denuclearize' Africa would be met by the means proposed in their draft resolution. There could be absolutely no guarantee that Africa would be 'atom-free' in the absence of effective international verification. Such verification is possible only within the context of agreement on disarmament in all its aspects ... It would therefore, in our view, be entirely unrealistic to expect that arrangements such as those proposed in the operative paragraph of the draft resolution* would be sufficient to isolate particular areas of the world from a nuclear war." (A/C.1/PV.1190, p.6)

So in 1961, resorting to criteria which differ totally from those resorted to in 1963, the British Government did not see favourably the denuclearization of Africa. But, with the change of times, criteria are changing too. We can only express the hope that the day will come -- and we hope that this time it will not take two years -- when the United Kingdom delegation will modify the criteria which "prevent" it from supporting other proposals aiming at the establishment of nuclear-free zones, especially in Europe.

The interests of the peace and security of our peoples, the interests of the peace and security of the whole of mankind, demand efficient action towards the elimination of nuclear danger. The acceptance and the implementation of the proposals on the creation of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world would make a substantial contribution in this direction. Every nuclear-free zone would represent an element in the vast action aimed at the denuclearization of the whole globe. The way is long and hard, but we have started on it. And with every passing day there are more of us. And, where there are many, there is the might and there is the future.

* A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): I hope the Committee will excuse my speaking a second time in the same week. It is not my usual practice, but I hope that my colleagues will bear with me for a few more minutes.

My remarks today will not depart from our established rules of procedure, for they are a continuation of my remarks of Monday last about collateral measures (ENDC/PV.142, pp.11 et s.). As I have already explained, we do not draw a sharp dividing line between Monday and Friday topics -- that is, nuclear tests and collateral measures respectively -- for does not a test ban constitute in effect the most important collateral measure? Our colleagues here will no doubt remember with what tenacity, confidence and continued hope my delegation has, since the beginning of this Conference, kept advocating a quick solution of the test ban problem as a prerequisite to the progress of our negotiations on collateral measures and general and complete disarmament. Therefore the joint memorandum of the three African delegations on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is a continuation of last year's efforts. Paragraph 3 of that memorandum expresses the conviction of its authors that --

"... direct contacts between the nuclear Powers, for example on the Foreign Ministers' level, and possibly direct communications and contacts between the Heads of the nuclear States and governments, may prove of great value in reaching a quick and adequate solution of this problem." (ENDC/94, p.2)

The Committee may recall also my delegation's words of 18 February:

"We are convinced that only the nuclear partners -- and possibly only at the highest level -- can find solutions to those problems, solutions which they will be ready and willing to implement." (ENDC/PV.99, p.16)

We went on to say on that occasion:

"We should be happy if the nuclear Powers decided to use the forum of the Sub-Committee or ... even the Conference itself. We have no objection to their making simultaneous use of any other channel available at whatever level, as long as they resume serious and dedicated talks ..." (ibid. p.18)

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

It is indeed a good omen for this Conference that, at a time when the non-aligned States in general, and the African States in particular, are engaged in finding ways and means to help to solve the most important of collateral measures -- that is, the test ban question --, the heads of the nuclear States should be closely following those efforts and finally deciding to crown them by taking that very judicious and mature political decision which we ourselves have been advocating.

The welcome news of the agreement by President Kennedy, Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Macmillan to hold high-level tripartite talks between their special representatives in Moscow in mid-July is a fulfilment of our fondest wishes and an answer to our afore-mentioned repeated appeals. My country sincerely welcomes that happy news and truly believes that the forthcoming high-level meeting is, as I have already pointed out, an appropriate crowning of the efforts of this Conference.

Although President Kennedy's announcement of this welcome news in his inspiring and encouraging speech (ENDC/95) came a bare few hours after the presentation of our memorandum, it gives me added pleasure to remind my colleagues that the memorandum had happily anticipated and, indeed, expressed the wish for the resumption of those direct high-level contacts when it stated in paragraph 7 that "the current British-American demarches at Moscow ... should be encouraged", and in paragraph 3 that "direct contacts between the nuclear Powers ... may prove of great value". (ENDC/94, pp. 2, 3). But the memorandum also appeals to the nuclear Powers -- and my delegation would certainly want to reiterate this exhortation to the high-level negotiating parties --

"... to give attention to those non-aligned ideas and thoughts ... which, in the last analysis, may prove to be good and lasting solutions to the test ban problem." (ibid, p.2)

We are confident that the negotiating parties will certainly want to take up the various suggestions offered in this Conference and that they will leave no stone unturned in their search for honourable, practicable and mutual compromise solutions. This last memorandum, added to the wealth of pertinent ideas and thoughts expressed during the course of our recent meetings, including my delegation's recent proposal (ENDC/PV.142, p.16) for a well-balanced and practicable collateral measures package deal, will certainly constitute a vast common fund of constructive ideas which the representatives of the nuclear Powers will, logically, want to draw upon in their meetings at Moscow.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

As a matter of fact my delegation would like to take this opportunity of welcoming the announcement of the high-level tripartite talks to say that the co-sponsors of the memorandum could not have wished for a better or a more suitable forum for giving their memorandum and their ideas the serious and promising discussion that they may deserve than the forthcoming meetings in Moscow. If that were to happen, the three African delegations would be more than rewarded for their efforts.

Here I repeat what I ended by saying on Monday last -- that we wish the high-level negotiating parties every success in their coming talks and hope that their meetings will usher in a new era of understanding and true peace.

On behalf of the co-sponsors of the memorandum, I want to express my delegation's sincere appreciation for the expressions of interest, sympathy, approval or support voiced by certain delegations at the meeting on Monday (ENDC/PV.142). The expression of initial interest or sympathy voiced by representatives of great Powers such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Italy cannot fail further to encourage the three African delegations to redouble their efforts for the success of our common cause. We share our Indian colleague's hopes (ibid, p.34) that our Soviet colleagues will naturally want to study the memorandum carefully, as a possibly significant contribution to the solution of this grave and pressing problem. We are certain that the efforts of the African States will continue to find the same understanding and encouragement which they have elicited from the Soviet Union on various occasions.

Finally, the three African non-aligned delegations are especially gratified by the unanimous approval that this memorandum has elicited from the other five non-aligned delegations in the Committee. The three African delegations are especially gratified and honoured by the Brazilian Government's official support of their memorandum, which, we are sure, gives it the added weight of that great country's prestige and importance in Latin America and in the councils of the world at large.

However, if we are indeed gratified, we are not surprised that it should be so; for, as I pointed out on Monday (ibid., p. 11), the memorandum is but a crystallization of the ideas and thoughts of the non-aligned world at large. The African label on it is incidental; it could very well have been the memorandum of the eight. And, in a way, it is the memorandum not only of the eight, but of eighty or more non-aligned, non-nuclear, peace-loving States, all anxious and desirous of contributing their modest best to finding a worthy compromise solution of the urgent test ban problem. It is an expression of the aspirations and wishes of a peace-hungry humanity which believes that a test ban is within the reach of the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Let me read out the text of a letter we have just received from the International Institute for Peace in Vienna in response to our memorandum. It says:

"We have learnt with great interest of the new proposals the three African delegations presented to the Conference. Answering the wishes of the people of many countries who expressed their interest in your proposals, and in order to popularize them among the organizations and individuals, our Institute has decided to publish these proposals as a brochure, which will appear in the next few days. We would be very grateful if you could send the full text of them in all the languages available."

It is for these reasons that the delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic would request the Secretariat kindly to take the necessary steps towards circulating the memorandum and the verbatim record of our 142nd meeting as official documents of the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

In the course of the discussion of proposals regarding measures aimed at the lessening of tension in international relations and reducing the threat of a nuclear missile war, measures which would undoubtedly facilitate agreement on the problem of general and complete disarmament, we have repeatedly pointed out that the assumption by States of the obligation not to use foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be an effective measure the implementation of which would undoubtedly help towards reducing the danger of a nuclear missile war.

The course of recent events in international life emphasizes even more forcibly the urgent need for agreement on this matter. The adoption of the declaration on renunciation by States of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) would undoubtedly reduce international tension and could become a turning point leading towards the improvement of international relations.

We are told that the Western Powers cannot accept this Soviet proposal because it is one-sided, that an obligation binding States to renounce the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons would affect only the United States and its NATO allies. We are further told that in the declaration there are no real elements of reciprocity, and that it does not contain any compensation to the United States in return for its agreement to adopt the declaration.

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All these arguments of the Western Powers, on the basis of which they refuse to adopt the Soviet draft declaration, are unfounded. In the first place, we must point out that at the present time -- eighteen years after the end of the Second World War -- an absolutely abnormal situation has been brought about in the world and is being maintained. In the post-war period the United States, having taken in international affairs a course aimed not at the peaceful co-existence of States but at carrying out a policy "from a position of strength", began to surround the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and other socialist States in Europe and Asia with a close network of military bases stationed on foreign territories thousands of miles away from the territory of the United States itself.

It has been noted in the press that there are many hundreds of United States military bases of all kinds on foreign territories. These bases encompass the socialist States from north to south and form two gigantic strategic semicircles. The northern semicircle is formed by the United States bases on the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Iceland and Greenland. It includes the joint United States-Canadian military installations on the territory of Canada, at which there may already be nuclear warheads in accordance with the recent agreement in Washington between the new Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Pearson, and the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy. The southern semicircle of United States bases passes through the Azores, Spain, Italy, Libya, Greece, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, South Vietnam, South Korea, Formosa, Okinawa and Japan.

To this must be added such a clearly provocative act, threatening the peoples of Southern Europe, the Near East and North Africa with very dangerous consequences, as the dispatching to the Mediterranean Sea, without the consent or knowledge of those peoples, of United States nuclear submarines armed with Polaris missiles carrying nuclear warheads. Everyone understands what a terrible danger for those peoples is involved in this desire of the United States to turn the entire Mediterranean area into an active zone of nuclear missile war. Bounding the shores of the Mediterranean Sea there are sixteen flourishing States: France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the United Arab Republic, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Spain, with a combined population of nearly three hundred million people. These military bases with their strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and the United States nuclear

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submarines with nuclear Polaris missiles on board roving about the Mediterranean Sea, are springboards of imperialist aggression. If one takes a look at recent events, one can easily see that such aggression is being intensively prepared within NATO.

To evaluate correctly the positions of the two sides and to describe them objectively it is very useful to compare the actions which reflect the foreign policy of the opposing forces -- the Soviet Union and the other socialist States on the one hand, and the Western Powers belonging to NATO on the other.

In addition to putting forward a broad programme of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1), the Soviet Union, being anxious to set the negotiations moving forward and to facilitate the achievement of agreement with the Western Powers, took a great step towards meeting them by agreeing to the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a strictly limited agreed number of inter-continental missiles until the end of stage 2 of general and complete disarmament (ibid., art. 5). The Soviet Union also made a move to meet the Western Powers with regard to conventional armaments, and agreed to the elimination of these armaments by way of percentage reductions in stages. The Soviet Government has also expressed its willingness to meet the Western Powers on a number of other issues connected with general and complete disarmament.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union and the delegations of the other socialist countries have proposed measures the implementation of which would undoubtedly lead to a lessening of international tension and to reducing the threat of a thermonuclear war. In this connexion it suffices to mention the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/77) and the draft declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). In the interests of averting the danger of war, the socialist countries have put forward a number of proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in the most sensitive areas of the world. We are referring above all to the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), as well as to the recent Soviet initiative aimed at turning the whole area of the Mediterranean Sea into a zone free from nuclear missile weapons (ENDC/91).

In recent years we have seen how not only the socialist States but also other peace-loving States have taken the path of the active struggle against war and against nuclear weapons by submitting proposals aimed at consolidating peace. This path is being taken by the young African States, on whose initiative a resolution declaring Africa a denuclearized zone (A/RES/1652 (XVI)) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as far back as

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1961. This path is also being taken by the Latin-American countries (ENDC/87), which are anxious that the whole of their continent should be freed from the threat of a thermo-nuclear catastrophe.

The desire to place thier countries beyond the danger of an atomic war is constantly gaining ground among many political and social leaders in Western Europe. An important initiative for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Northern Europe was recently taken by the President of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen (ENDC/PV.141). We observe even among certain NATO members a constantly-increasing desire to rid their countries of nuclear weapons. In particular, Norway and Denmark have announced their refusal to have nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles stationed on their territories. All this clearly and convincingly demonstrates the irresistible striving of the peoples for peace, and confirms the justice and wisdom of the political line, aimed at eliminating the danger of war and consolidating peace, which is constantly being advocated by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. To this should be added the unrelenting efforts of the Soviet Government in regard to inter-State relations, aimed at consolidating peace and eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war.

Unfortunately we observe a different, directly opposite line in international affairs on the part of the United States and its NATO allies. They refuse to accept the Soviet proposal, inspired by a spirit of compromise, for the retention of a so-called "protective nuclear umbrella" during the first two stages of disarmament. They refuse to accept the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. They show stubborn unwillingness to accept the declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. They gave a hostile reception to the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. They responded without any particular enthusiasm to the initiative of the Presidents of the five Latin-American Republics for making the whole of Latin America a denuclearized zone.

The representatives of the Western Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, without waiting for their governments to study the Soviet proposal to declare the whole area of the Mediterranean Sea a zone free from nuclear weapons, declared this proposal to be unacceptable to them. The Western Powers took the same attitude towards the recent proposal of the President of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen, for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Northern Europe, and so on and so forth.

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The explanation for this negative attitude of the Western Powers towards all proposals aimed at reducing the threat of war is easy to find if we compare their position here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee with the measures which they are carrying out with feverish haste outside the Committee. Despite the fact that the armaments race and the accumulation of stockpiles of nuclear weapons have already reached such colossal proportions that they are already becoming senseless even from the standpoint of the leaders of the war departments, the Western Powers nevertheless continue to accelerate the armaments race and to increase their nuclear arsenals, by spreading thermonuclear weapons ever wider among their allies and giving the West German Bundeswehr access to them.

Recently the Ministry of Military Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany published information to the effect that the West German Bundeswehr had begun, in the present month of June, to receive from the United States nuclear missiles of the Sergeant type through the West German port of Bremen. This is already the third type of nuclear missiles being supplied by the United States to the West German Bundeswehr. A few years ago nuclear missiles of the Honest John and Pershing types and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons of the Matador and Mace types began to be supplied for the armament of the Bundeswehr.

While here in the Committee the representatives of the Western Powers are by their position paralyzing all efforts aimed at achieving agreement on general and complete disarmament, on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and on collateral measures aimed at the lessening of international tension and the reduction of the threat of a nuclear missile war, the staffs of the NATO countries are working intensively on practical measures for the creation of a NATO nuclear force. A start on this was made at the Athens session of NATO, in the decisions of which it was stated to be necessary that all the countries members of NATO should participate in working out a policy of nuclear defence. Then there followed in December 1962 the Paris session of NATO, at which the United States announced that it was ready to create a joint nuclear striking force together with the European countries. For the purpose of implementing these plans a United Kingdom-United States agreement was concluded at Nassau. After that only a few months went by, and at the Ottawa session of the NATO Council the creation of a NATO nuclear force with the participation of the West German Bundeswehr was officially confirmed.

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Furthermore, negotiations are now in progress on further steps towards the creation of a so-called multilateral NATO nuclear force. Concrete plans have already been worked out for the organization of a submarine fleet with mixed crews, armed with Polaris missiles carrying nuclear warheads. It is also proposed to create a surface nuclear fleet with mixed crews from the various NATO countries. Moreover, it appears that the NATO Powers, in violation of all the rules of international law, are planning to equip commercial vessels with missiles carrying nuclear warheads, and are not hesitating thus to convert merchant ships into pirate vessels.

To this must be added the fact that the United States, in flagrant violation of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/1762(XVII), ENDC/63), is continuing nuclear weapon tests. In this regard the United States is at one with its NATO partner France, which, while refusing to take part in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, is at the same time carrying out nuclear weapon tests in Africa, thereby flagrantly violating the sovereignty of the African countries.

The Ottawa session of the NATO Council adopted a decision which even further aggravates the international situation. The creation of a NATO nuclear force, together with the stationing in the Mediterranean Sea of United States nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles carrying nuclear warheads, means that from now on the number of potential foci of aggression will be increased many times. In the light of all these facts it is difficult to avoid the impression that the Western Powers are using the Eighteen-Nation Committee only as a screen to cover up their real plans, which have nothing to do with the consolidation of peace or with disarmament.

The statements made in the Committee by the representatives of the Western Powers with regard to the Soviet draft declaration show that our Western partners in the negotiations, instead of approaching the consideration of these proposals from a constructive standpoint and trying to find a way to reach agreement, are concerned with something quite different: how to place as many barriers as possible in the way of the accomplishment of the measure proposed by us for the elimination of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territories, and to justify the armaments race being carried on by the NATO countries. They do not take the trouble to study attentively the explanations given by the Soviet delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries on this question, and repeat from one meeting to the next their completely unfounded objections to the Soviet draft declaration.

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In our statement today we should like to dwell on some of the main objections put forward by the Western Powers against our proposal. The main objection put forward by the Western Powers against the Soviet draft declaration is that this proposal is of a one-sided nature and that its adoption would entail the assumption of one-sided obligations by the United States and its Western allies. In this connexion we should like to point out in the first place that this proposal is not of a one-sided nature, and that secondly, for the purpose of safeguarding international security, States would not in every case have to assume obligations absolutely equal in their scope and material terms, and it would not be physically possible to do so in every case. Above all, we should like to point out the obvious unsoundness of the argument of the representatives of the Western Powers that the draft declaration submitted by us to the Committee is of a one-sided nature--in other words, that it binds with an obligation to renounce the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons only the United States and its Western allies, but does not bind the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

This assertion is untrue. The draft declaration makes no exceptions. It provides for an obligation also on the part of the Soviet Union not to station strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territory or in the territorial waters of other States. It is the complete disregard or underestimation by the representatives of the Western Powers of this aspect of the matter that leads them to such unfounded assertions: namely, that the declaration is of a one-sided nature--that is to say, that it imposes no obligations on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Such an approach of the Western representatives to the evaluation of this Soviet proposal is a manifestation of their obvious short-sightedness in this matter. International life cannot be regarded as something static, hard set in the forms in which we see it today. International life is a process in which everything is in motion, and if something does not exist today it may very well appear tomorrow. Our task is to eliminate what is undesirable and dangerous in present-day international relations and to take measures to prevent the emergence of any dangerous situations in the future. The Soviet proposals, including the draft declaration submitted to the Committee, serve precisely to achieve this aim. It is therefore natural that the United States will have to carry out certain measures, precisely in the field in which it has gone too far and is threatening peace.

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It must be recognized that this difference is caused by the orientation and nature of the policy of the United States. The United States, by adhering to the policy "from a position of strength", has brought about a situation in international life which is directly contrary to the aim of normalizing the international situation, is obstructing the safeguarding of international security, and is frustrating the cause of world peace. In fact, can it be regarded as a normal situation when in peacetime the United States maintains many hundreds and, according to certain information, even thousands of military bases of every kind on foreign territories? There is no need to mention to what an extent such an extremely abnormal phenomenon of these days as that created by the United States policy "from a position of strength" is aggravating the existing international situation, poisoning the atmosphere of international life, undermining confidence, and still further increasing suspicion in the relations between States.

In the interests of general peace and international security, the Soviet Union has already repeatedly raised the question of eliminating all foreign bases on the territories of other States and the withdrawal of all foreign military forces stationed on the territories of other States. But the Western Powers invariably reject such proposals. We must therefore accept the fact that the Western Powers are unwilling to agree to the implementation of such an important and very necessary measure.

In the circumstances of the refusal of the Western Powers to agree to the implementation of the Soviet Union's radical proposal for the elimination of all military bases on the territories of other States and the withdrawal of all foreign troops therefrom, the Soviet Union submitted its draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). The United States, which has taken the course of stationing such means of delivery on foreign territories all around the Soviet Union and other socialist States, has thereby increased international tension to the limit and created a real and serious threat to international security and world peace. In order to normalize the international situation and to create a situation which would be in keeping with the generally-accepted norms of peacetime, it is necessary, as a first step towards lessening tension, for all of us to agree to the renunciation of the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territories.

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The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada, in trying to justify their negative attitude towards the Soviet draft declaration, have actually turned everything upside down. If one approaches the matter from a realistic standpoint, it is quite clear -- and, of course, in private the representatives of the Western Powers also understand this -- that precisely the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, like the whole policy of establishing military bases on foreign territories, is one of the most important causes underlying present international tension. And no verbal gymnastics can refute the obvious fact that the United States policy of establishing military bases abroad, of building missile launching sites, and despatching submarines with Polaris missiles to the shores of other States, is contrary to the basic interests of ensuring lasting peace and is being carried out in defiance of the wishes of all mankind.

We have often stated, and we repeat, that United States military bases abroad and, above all, their main core -- strategic means of delivery of atomic and hydrogen weapons -- are springboards for aggression, foci of international provocation, and sources of a threat to the whole world. The peoples decisively condemn the policy of stationing military bases on foreign territories; they rightly demand their elimination, and are actively opposing the particularly great danger represented by the stationing abroad of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Remember what angry words in condemnation of the imperialist policy of establishing foreign military bases were uttered at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly by the representatives of many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. I should like to quote by way of example from the speech made by the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Adebo:

"My delegation is convinced that the existence of foreign military bases has aggravated international tension and led to the intensification of the armaments race. Foreign bases do embitter the relations between neighbours. We should therefore like to see them done away with in toto and as quickly as possible". (A/C.1/PV.1271, p.6)

That, Western representatives, is how the world judges the Western Powers' policy of establishing military bases abroad. Yet here in the Committee you assert that not only the retention of these bases themselves, but also the stationing there of the most powerful means of aggression -- the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- would be better for peace than would their removal. Of course your statements convince no one.

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Furthermore, when the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, tries to depict United States bases with strategic missiles as "doves of peace" which are not worth bothering about, he appears to forget that the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, described the role of missile weapons in the statement he made last autumn. Although we have already had occasion to refer to this statement, I should nevertheless like to remind the United States delegation of it again:

"We no longer live in a world where the active firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially-increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace".

But does not the sending of United States missile-carrying submarines into the Mediterranean Sea close to the borders of the socialist and other peace-loving States, or the basing of United States nuclear submarines at Holy Loch in Scotland, create -- to use the words of President Kennedy -- a "substantially-increased possibility" of the use of ballistic missiles? Cannot these actions by the United States be considered a definite threat to peace, as President Kennedy said?

Since the United States side is apparently more receptive to arguments put forward in the United States itself, I should like to quote a short excerpt from the United States journal The Nation of last autumn:

"... it is also an incontrovertible fact -- whether we consider our bases in that way or not -- that the creation of bases on the territories of foreign States will unavoidably be considered as a provocative act".

Further, the journal stated:

"We can only hope that under the influence of the Cuban crisis we" -- that is, the United States -- "will overcome the rigidity of American thinking which has made it so difficult for us, if not impossible, to accept the thought that the Soviet Union might quite honestly and sincerely consider our bases to be a threat to its security."

In our former statements we have already drawn the attention of the participants in the negotiations also to the fact that the spread of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons throughout the world, whether the missile bases are fixed or mobile, greatly increases the threat of a so-called war through accident. The remoteness of

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these bases from the political centres of control, their proximity to the borders of the States against which they are aimed, and the fact that they have a certain autonomy within the limits of the operational task assigned to them -- this applies in particular to nuclear submarines --: these and many other factors create a situation in which a conflict can break out as the result of an error, incident, failure of communications, miscalculation, psychological shock and so on.

Thus, from whatever angle we approach this aspect of the problem of military bases, the facts we have cited prove beyond all question that the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons stationed on foreign territories are a smouldering fuse of war placed beneath the edifice of peace. These facts show convincingly the complete groundlessness of the argument of the Western representatives that the implementation of the Soviet draft declaration would jeopardize international security. The situation is exactly the opposite, and this is recognized by everyone except the NATO Powers. One can assert with full justification that if our Western partners in the negotiations had not sinned against truth and had not distorted the real situation, they would have admitted unconditionally that this Soviet proposal is aimed at clearing one of the most dangerous sections of the path towards lasting peace.

We should like to dwell on still another argument put forward by the Western Powers against our draft declaration. The representatives of the NATO countries in the Committee assert, for example, that the adoption and implementation of the Soviet proposal regarding strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons would lead to a worsening of the international situation; that it would upset stability and practically jeopardize peace. You remember, of course, that as far back as 29 March the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, stated:

"Indeed, the consequences of the potential instability which would arise after the implementation of the draft declaration could be disastrous for the Soviet Union as well as for Europe, for the United States and, indeed, for the whole world." (ENDC/PV.115, p.44)

This statement by Mr. Godber was not just a phrase dropped casually.

At the meeting of 24 May the other United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, referring to the Soviet proposal, practically repeated the words of Mr. Godber. He again spoke about the "unstable and potentially dangerous situation" which would be created by putting into force the Soviet draft declaration (ENDC/PV.136, p.28). The

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same idea has been repeatedly put forward in the statements made in the Committee by the representatives of the United States, Canada and Italy.

But what can we say about this sort of argument put forward by the Western delegations? If we take these assertions in their pure, so to say refined, form, we get a quite paradoxical picture. In fact, according to the logic of these statements of the Western representatives, it turns out that when States establish military bases on foreign territories, station strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons at such bases, and send nuclear submarines armed with missiles with nuclear warheads to the shores of other countries, they are thereby consolidating peace; but if they agreed not to station on foreign territory the means of waging nuclear war, then peace would be in a catastrophic position.

The representatives of the Western Powers have a very strange logic! To say that the removal of the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons from foreign bases would jeopardize peace is the same as saying that the removal of a torch from a powder magazine would increase the danger of an explosion. In fact, in this perverted reasoning of the Western Powers one can clearly see a frank vindication of the armaments race, a defence of the policy of spreading military bases, strategic missiles, bombers and submarines abroad.

In analyzing the operative paragraphs of our declaration, the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, said at the meeting of 29 March that:

"they are not only one-sided, they are positively dangerous."

(ENDC/PV.115, p.41)

Explaining this assertion, Mr. Godber pointed out that:

"the Soviet Union holds on its own territory sufficient medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles and medium range bombers to devastate Western Europe." (ibid)

He referred to data provided by the British Institute for Strategic Studies. In giving these data he did not quote one single figure concerning similar weapons of the States of the NATO military bloc, although he should have done so in the interests of objectivity. Mr. Godber did not do so because operational weapons such as fighter-bombers, nuclear bomb carriers and aircraft missiles of the Mace and Matador types located at bases of the European States members of NATO, without taking into account British bombers of the "Y" type and nuclear missiles, are in fact much more numerous

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than the numbers quoted by Mr. Godber from the booklet issued by the British Institute as being in possession of the Warsaw Treaty States.

It is highly significant that, when the United Kingdom representatives Mr. Godber and Sir Paul Mason tell us here that "not one Soviet missile of the immense armoury ... need be removed" (*ibid.* p.42), they for some reason make no mention at all of similar weapons at the disposal of NATO. But these weapons of NATO would also not be withdrawn; and, as we have said, they are no less numerous than those in the possession of the Warsaw Treaty States. But our draft declaration speaks of strategical means -- that is, missiles with a range of at least 1,500 kilometres and strategic carrier aircraft. That is what we are talking about. Therefore, gentlemen, do not try to distort the substance of the question; do not mislead the members of the Committee either with figures or with the philosophy of the geographical factor.

In objecting to our proposal, you tell us that the declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons contains no real elements of reciprocity. But may we ask what kind of reciprocity you are talking about? After all, the Soviet Union has no military bases around the United States. Nor does it have any around the United States NATO allies. This fact shows that the United States and its allies are not exposed to such threats in the form of nuclear missiles constantly trained on them from very close foreign military bases as those to which the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are exposed.

What kind of a reciprocity would you, the representatives of the Western Powers, like to have in this case? Once again I call your attention to the fact that there are no foreign military bases around the United States and its NATO allies from which strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons could be aimed at them and threaten their security. In the situation existing today the United States and its NATO allies are not threatened with a nuclear missile strike from foreign military bases located on adjacent territories, and in this respect they undoubtedly enjoy a certain security. If in this case we were to use the term used by the representative of the Western Powers, we could say that they enjoy this kind of security "unilaterally", "without real elements of reciprocity", and without any sort of "compensation" to the other side for the enjoyment of such security.

But the situation is much worse. The Western Powers understand reciprocity in a rather strange way. They themselves enjoy, to their great satisfaction, the security

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guaranteed them by the absence of foreign military bases with nuclear weapons in close proximity to their territories, and respond by encircling the other side with their military bases on foreign territories, and from these bases they are constantly threatening the Soviet Union and its allies with a surprise attack. This situation creates a real danger which we cannot disregard, especially when we recall the well-known statement of responsible leaders in the United States that in certain circumstances the United States might resort to a preventive nuclear war against the Soviet Union.

The United States regards as normal a situation in which it and its allies would enjoy -- to use their own terminology -- unilaterally, without reciprocity and without compensation, a certain degree of security, whereas the Soviet Union and its allies would continue to be in just the opposite situation -- that is, they not only would not enjoy the same security as the United States and its allies, but on the contrary they would permanently be a target for strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons from adjacent bases on foreign territories. We rightly and for good reasons consider such a situation abnormal and fraught with consequences exceedingly dangerous to the cause of world peace, and we insist on its being rectified.

The attempt of the representatives of the Western Powers to maintain that the elimination of military bases on foreign territories would reduce the security of their States is altogether groundless. These assertions are contrary to the real facts of contemporary life. We will give some well-known examples.

Before the second world war the United Kingdom had a large number of various military bases on foreign territories; but these bases did not safeguard the security of Great Britain, nor did they save it from the savage military blows inflicted upon it by the Hitlerite and Japanese armed forces. The same must be said of France, which also had a large number of various military bases on foreign territories. But did the existence of these bases safeguard the security of France or protect it from invasion by the Hitlerite hordes, from total military defeat and occupation? The most convincing answer to this question is given by the second world war.

In discussing the role of military bases on foreign territories for safeguarding the security of the States having such bases at their disposal, one has necessarily to take into consideration such a decisive factor, which has radically altered the previous, so to speak, classical ideas and concepts of the principles of warfare and the security of

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States, as the emergence of nuclear weapons and such means of delivering them to their targets as rockets. If during the second world war bases on foreign territories did not safeguard the security of the States having such bases at their disposal and did not save them from military defeats, today, under modern conditions, when the strategy and tactics of war are determined by nuclear missile weapons which possess a destructive power millions of times greater than that of chemical explosives, and can be delivered with colossal speed, within minutes, to any point of the globe, these bases have lost all significance from the standpoint of safeguarding security.

At the same time, bases on foreign territory with the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons stationed there are a definite threat to the security of other States and undoubtedly play an exceptionally intense provocative role. These bases can at any moment give rise to a military conflict, a nuclear missile war, which would within a few moments leave nothing remaining of the security of the States involved in it. We must also emphasize as strongly as possible that the States on whose territory such bases are stationed would undoubtedly be the targets of a devastating nuclear missile strike within the very first minutes of a crisis. Consequently the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territories involves a mortal threat also to the States which have made their territories available for such purposes.

Now let us consider this question from another angle. Are such States as the members of our Committee, Sweden, Brazil and Mexico or, for example, Switzerland, the host country of our Committee, which have no foreign military bases on their territories, in a position of less security than, for instance, the United Kingdom, Italy or Turkey, which have United States military bases on their territories? The situation is exactly the opposite. It is a well-known fact that the wise and cautious policy of these States in this regard has enabled them to enjoy the blessings of peace and security. A similar wise decision on this question has apparently been taken also by the Government of Iran, which has assumed an obligation not to allow foreign military bases with nuclear missile weapons on its territory. This has only enhanced the security of Iran.

Of course, with such an approach to the solution of the problems of general and complete disarmament as that of the representatives of the Western Powers, we shall never be able to solve these problems. In fact, our talks here in the Committee are not concerned with disarmament but with armaments. The representatives of the Western Powers propose that we "disarm" in such a way that in stage I nuclear weapons would be

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retained, as well as all bases and 70 per cent of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and that the existing structure of the NATO armed forces would be maintained until the very end of stage II of disarmament. This is a parody of disarmament. Only professional military men who have linked their destiny with war can talk in that way; and above all, of course, such a negative approach to disarmament is in the interests of the United States military-industrial complex. But this is not what the peoples need; they are calling for genuine disarmament and urgent measures leading to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war hanging over mankind.

The United States and its NATO allies should not forget that for every poison there is an antidote, and that every action causes a counter-action. Common sense requires that, instead of complicating the situation, we should try to find a way to simplify and normalize it. It would be wrong to determine the nature and scope of the obligations to be assumed by the two sides for the future only in the light of the situation existing at the present time and without taking into account the security requirements of both sides. The nature and scope of the obligations to be assumed by the two sides for the future, for the purpose of ensuring greater security for their peoples and normalizing the relations between them, must be determined not only by the events and phenomena of the present day but also with due regard to both past experience and the prospects for the future. Only with such an approach shall we be able to avoid narrowness and onesidedness in the measures we are to work out and to ensure equal conditions of security for both sides.

For this reason it is necessary, I emphasize once again, to put an end to the existing dangerous situation. It must be changed in such a way that both sides -- the United States and its allies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other -- would enjoy an equal degree of security, would enjoy to an equal extent the blessings of security, even though it may be of a limited nature in the early stages.

The unwillingness of the United States to agree, not only to the proposal for the elimination of bases but even to such a limited measure as the renunciation of the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territories, admits of only one explanation: namely that the United States continues to adhere to the policy of preparing for war with the Soviet Union and the other socialist States. If this is not so, and the United States together with its NATO allies are bent on peaceful co-existence and not on war, they should not oppose the elimination of these bases.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

For all the more reason they can have no grounds for objecting to the adoption of the declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to stress the fact that the position taken here in the Committee by the representatives of the Western Powers, which is preventing the achievement of any measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, is obviously not in keeping with the general tone and content of the speech made by President Kennedy at the American University on 10 June. In this speech President Kennedy announced his intention to put an end to the cold war, which is weighing like a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples. He said: "Peace need not be impracticable -- and war need not be inevitable." (ENDC/95, p.2). His appeal to break the vicious and dangerous circle in which the peoples have found themselves as a result of the cold war cannot fail to meet with approval and support on the part of all men of goodwill. President Kennedy's speech inspires the hope that the efforts being made both within and outside our Committee to improve the international situation, to create an atmosphere of confidence among the countries, and to embark upon the practical implementation of disarmament measures, will not be in vain.

All of us are waiting for President Kennedy's thoughts and views on peaceful co-existence to be put into practice. In this regard the United States can rely on the full support and co-operation of the Soviet Union. We hope that, in the light of the thoughts and ideas expressed by the President of the United States, the Western Powers will reconsider their position on the questions under discussion in the Committee, on the proposals concerning general and complete disarmament, partial measures, a non-aggression pact, the creation of denuclearized zones and other matters, in order to set the lives of the peoples on our planet free from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

We trust that the United States, as one of the first steps towards lessening international tension and reducing the threat of a nuclear missile war, will show goodwill and adopt the declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): With the Committee's leave, I should like to speak as representative of Italy.

For some weeks now debates on collateral measures have been proceeding in this Committee without yielding any appreciable results. As was to be feared, these discussions for which there was no precise agenda followed a rather disorderly course and were inconclusive. They did not relate to a particular item; they touched on practically every subject; proposals were put forward concerning a large number of problems; and replies were given on both sides to objections and to questions. But it seems to me that the work has not advanced on a concrete or fruitful basis.

True, in spite of these difficulties our debates have not been completely useless. We have heard reciprocal explanations of points of view, and the opposing theses are now better known. Nevertheless, I think it is high time that our Committee abandoned the general debate which deals uselessly with a great number of subjects, and concentrated on a concrete task, more limited but more effective, with a clearer picture of the characteristics which the collateral disarmament measures must possess in order to be wholly in keeping with their objective.

We know why we decided by common consent to work out collateral disarmament measures in addition and parallel to our main task-- that of drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The reason is well known. Everybody realizes that the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament is a long-term operation, that its application will take several stages, and that its implementation will inevitably require a number of years.

On the other hand, everybody realizes that the first steps on the road to disarmament should not and cannot be delayed. It is in this spirit that we approached the problem of the immediate disarmament measures, and it is for this reason that all the delegations agreed that one meeting every week should be devoted to the study of measures which, in order to be immediate, should aim at arrangements that are practical, simple and comparatively easy to carry out. Among all these arrangements there are some whose characteristics as collateral measures are particularly prominent and which, because of their urgency and relative facility, are recommended in the first place.

(The Chairman, Italy)

Let us consider for a moment the present situation. Which among all the present impending dangers should be eliminated first? Obviously it is the danger of war breaking out without the parties concerned wishing to provoke it. Each one of us pins his faith on his Government's wisdom and sense of responsibility. We know, indeed, that it is difficult, if not almost impossible, that in our nuclear age a war bringing disaster to mankind should be started deliberately. But we live in a world filled with mistrust. In this atmosphere of mistrust, in this climate of international tension, a gesture or event which may be not ill-intentioned but ill-interpreted could lead to catastrophe. In the present state of international relations and of technology the possibility of a war by mistake, however crazy it may seem at first sight, cannot be ignored. This tragic possibility cannot be excluded if we do not make specific arrangements forthwith, and if we do not establish appropriate safeguards immediately.

This point of view is indisputable and, in fact, I believe has not been disputed. I would even say it has been indirectly confirmed by the Soviet delegation. The promptness with which the Soviet delegation welcomed (ENDC/PV.118, p.52) the United States proposal (ENDC/70, p.10) for the establishment of a direct line of communication between Moscow and Washington is, in my opinion, evidence that the Soviet Government shares the anxieties I have just mentioned and considers that direct explanations and clarifications between the two greatest world Powers are essential for avoiding fatal mistakes and ambiguities.

In this connexion, I believe that the technical work undertaken by United States and Soviet experts to establish a direct line between Moscow and Washington, after the decision of principle taken in the Conference, is already well advanced, and we may hope that it will be concluded without delay. During an earlier meeting my delegation asked that, as soon as the said agreement is negotiated, the Committee should draft an additional report to the United Nations to inform all countries of this first result of the work of our Conference. I said "of our Conference" because I believe that the agreement of which I speak, though bilateral, would have been less easy to arrive at, and even perhaps unrealizable, if all the delegations present here had not encouraged it and had not, by their appeals and efforts of goodwill, created an atmosphere favourable to this understanding (ENDC/97).

(The Chairman, Italy)

However, the establishment of a direct line between Moscow and Washington is but a first step, a first and partial achievement. Proceeding from the same premise: that full knowledge of intentions is necessary on both sides in order to remove the danger of a war by accident, it is evident that the means of getting to know and understand one another should be enlarged as much as possible at all levels. Before long a direct line will link together the two supreme heads of the most powerful countries in the world, and the line will be ready to operate in the event of a serious crisis. It will operate in borderline cases, in cases fraught with very serious danger for peace. That is a contingency which, I venture to hope, will never occur, and I trust that this teleprinter will safeguard peace without ever being put into operation.

However --and this is probable --less dangerous crises may arise. We may be faced with less immediate and urgent situations for which it would be neither necessary nor even desirable to bring into operation this important liaison machinery. Other means might suffice for clarifying or correcting a situation. In some cases the clouds would be dispelled without recourse to the "hot line", and technical explanations at a lower level might suffice to avert the danger of a false alarm, provided that the information is exchanged in good time and that appropriate machinery exists for this purpose. This appears to me to be obvious.

Accordingly, we wonder why the Soviet delegation, after agreeing to the establishment of a direct line of communication at the very highest level, should now refuse to follow the course which seems dictated by logic: for logic would suggest, as a further collateral measure, that the establishment of other regular technical communications which would maintain normal liaison at a lower level should be considered. The object of these measures would be the same as that of the direct line: to dispel on both sides any misunderstanding of the intentions of the parties concerned, with the added advantage that these communications at a lower level could be maintained permanently and continuously and so would serve not only to solve but also to forestall crises.

For these purposes the Western delegations have made some very simple suggestions which could be easily and quickly implemented. Perhaps they are not the only ones that could be devised. Other means of contact and information might be usefully

(The Chairman, Italy)

employed in furtherance of the same object. All these means might usefully be considered by our Committee with a view to an agreement. We should be very happy if the Soviet delegation would likewise put forward suggestions and additional proposals; we should consider them with the closest and most earnest attention. Naturally, the Soviet delegation should not, under the pretext of eliminating the risks of war by accident, put forward proposals not really having anything to do with the aims of the collateral measures. If it claimed, for example, that the only means of eliminating this danger would be to destroy immediately all the thermonuclear bombs and all the vehicles carrying nuclear weapons, it would only be resorting to tautology.

We are all perfectly aware that if this elimination were possible, there would be no further risk of war; but that would be wishful thinking. Unfortunately, we know that this is not always possible. Therefore, the Soviet delegation and the other delegations of the socialist countries should not continue to submit to our Committee, describing them as collateral measures, isolated, complicated and uncontrollable disarmament measures which are contrary to the principles of balance and which appear to ignore completely essential geographical facts and to aim merely at weakening the Western defences unilaterally.

The problem to which we should give priority is, in my view, quite specific. In a world which is still armed, where the involuntary launching of a missile can start a conflict of unprecedented scale, how could one banish forever a contingent cause of anxiety, the risk of misunderstanding in difficult situations? That is the problem and that is the question which call for an answer here without delay.

If the Soviet delegation -- which, like us, realizes the existing risks, since it has agreed to the direct line of communication between Moscow and Washington -- would consent not to reject our suggestions without thorough study, if it would in its turn submit its own, then the Committee would have before it a series of proposals the study of which might easily lead us to the desired goal. By studying them thoroughly, either from the technical or from the political angle, we might perhaps together work out a complete solution to this problem of the risks of war by accident, which, for the moment, has found only a partial solution.

My delegation would therefore suggest that the Committee should regard the general debate on collateral measures as ended and should concentrate on a specific, concrete

(The Chairman, Italy)

and well-defined subject. My delegation hopes that the Committee's next task will be to complete the elaboration of the whole set of those safeguards which have found in the establishment of the direct Moscow-Washington communication line their first appreciable-- though only partial-- implementation. In my opinion, this direct line should form part of a greater and more complete system capable of providing us with a total solution of the problem of the risk of war by accident. I believe that it is only in this way that the Committee can at the present stage advance its work on a solid basis and so discharge its great responsibility in a concrete manner.

It is five minutes to one; I still have the representative of Bulgaria on my list of speakers, and the representative of the United States has asked for the floor to exercise his right of reply. I would therefore ask the representative of Bulgaria whether he would prefer to speak today, or if he thinks he can postpone his statement until the next meeting.

Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): In view of the late hour, I agree to defer my statement to a future meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I thank you, and call upon the representative of the United States to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I should like at the outset to thank the representative of Bulgaria for yielding to me at this time.

I can only hope that the major portion of the speech which we have heard today from the representative of the Soviet Union was drafted before he had had time to read, or at least reflect upon, the speech made on Monday of this week by President Kennedy (ENDC/95). We know that he has read President Kennedy's speech, because he referred to it at the close of his statement. He referred to it in encouraging terms, and my delegation is most happy about that reference.

But in the major portion of his statement this morning we heard again what has become the all too typical cold-war speech from the Soviet delegation. We heard the familiar unfriendly references to the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany; we heard the all too familiar distortions of United States and Western positions in

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

this Conference; we heard the inaccurate descriptions of United States reactions to various proposals which have been made by the eight new members of this Conference; we heard the familiar claims that the United States and the West are using this Committee to screen their military preparations; and we heard the all too familiar general and false attack upon the motives of the United States and the West.

I submit that that statement of the Soviet representative was not in keeping with the general spirit of President Kennedy's speech made last Monday. Specifically, President Kennedy stated that "United States diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely theoretical hostility." (ibid., p.4) I trust that in due course the spirit of President Kennedy's statement made last Monday will find response and will inform the future statements of the Soviet representative at our Conference.

The Soviet representative today devoted a major portion of his statement to defence of the Soviet proposed declaration on the withdrawal of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles from foreign territories and waters (ENDC/75). He incorporated in that a long harangue against foreign bases. In that harangue he adduced the support of representatives of many countries at the United Nations General Assembly. In particular, he quoted the representative of Nigeria accurately as saying:

"Foreign bases do embitter the relations between neighbours. We should therefore like to see them done away with in toto and as quickly as possible."

(A/C.1/PV.1271, p.6)

But on that occasion the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Adebo, went on to say:

"But in this as in other matters relating to disarmament we must be realistic. Some foreign bases are not the cause but the consequence of international tension. They were established because the country in which they are located felt them to be necessary for its own security. It felt this need because it had reason to fear an invasion from one or the other of its neighbours. In this class of case, it is unrealistic to demand the removal of the foreign base without first doing something to remove the thing that brought it about. Confidence must be restored between the neighbours concerned." (ibid.)

Those are very wise words. The Soviet representative described the system of collective defence installations which have been built up since the end of World War II in collective security by the United States and its friends and allies as an abnormal situation. We do not need to go into the reason why those collective defence

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

installations were built up and why they exist. We, for our part, are confident we know the reasons; but if I may again use President Kennedy's words -- this time addressed to the cold war -- he said:

"Let us re-examine our attitude towards the cold war, remembering we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is; and not as it might have been had the history of the last eighteen years been different." (ENDC/95, p.4)

These collective defence installations exist; they are part of the world as it is; it does no good to describe them as an abnormal situation; and we do not need to go into the reasons why this system came into being. The situation exists, and in this situation the Soviet draft declaration on the withdrawal of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons from overseas territories (ENDC/75) is clearly one-sided.

The first operative paragraph of the Soviet proposal, calling for the abolition of so-called foreign bases for submarines carrying nuclear weapons, is a demand for unilateral disengagement or redeployment by the West. The second operative paragraph, concerning the withdrawal of aircraft carriers from foreign ports, would affect only the West, since the Soviet Union has not placed any part of its strength in the form of aircraft carriers. Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 deal respectively with strategic missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometres and strategic aircraft located in foreign territory, and would involve unilateral disarmament or redeployment by the States members of NATO while leaving Western Europe under the undisturbed and ominous threat of Soviet missiles and aircraft. That proposal is clearly one-sided and is unacceptable.

In closing, may I repeat again that I was gratified by the reference made by the Soviet representative to President Kennedy's speech? I hope that in the future we can try to carry out the spirit of that speech. May I just end by quoting one passage? President Kennedy said:

"... let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal." (ENDC/95, p.4)

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I call upon the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I shall be very brief. I do not agree with the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, who tried to attach the cold war label to my statement when he said that it was made in the spirit of the cold war and apparently drafted before we had studied President Kennedy's speech.

I have already said that President Kennedy's speech on 10 June inspires hope -- if, of course, those good and in many respects excellent sentences are followed by real deeds, because, as the saying goes, theory without practice is dead, or "faith without works is dead". But what did you see in my statement, Mr. Stelle, that could be regarded as relating to the cold war? What was I talking of and pointing out in my statement? I said that all the Soviet Union's proposals are aimed at genuine disarmament, that they refer to measures aimed at eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war, at the lessening of international tension in international relations, and I pointed out that all these measures are rejected by the Western Powers.

You do not accept a non-aggression pact; you do not accept the proposal for renunciation of use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategical means of delivery; you do not accept the proposal regarding denuclearized zones; nor do you accept a number of other proposals in this Committee. But outside the walls of the Committee -- in Ottawa, -- decisions are being taken, aimed at intensifying the nuclear armaments race as well as the conventional armaments race, at adopting measures aimed at bringing nuclear missile weapons still further within the reach of the revanchists of Western Germany. Do these actions, in your opinion, correspond to the spirit of President Kennedy's speech?

I am bound to say that we shall continue in the future to uphold our proposals aimed at disarmament, at the lessening of international tension, at the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war; we shall in fact analyse your objections to these proposals of ours. I offer my apologies, but do not expect "delicacy" from us in this respect; do not hope that we shall not criticize your position and your objections, if they are aimed at refusing to adopt measures facilitating disarmament, the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, or the lessening of international tension. We shall do so until we succeed in agreeing on such measures.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It seems to us that our criticism of the Western Powers' position for their refusal to accept proposals aimed at real disarmament measures, the lessening of international tension, and the elimination of nuclear missile war, can in no way be called a manifestation of the cold war. On the contrary, it shows that we are manifesting concern to come to an agreement as soon as possible on these most important issues. It means concern for peace, concern for doing away as quickly as possible with the vestiges of the cold war, which may still be observed in certain policies and actions. Take the Ottawa decisions -- they, and not our criticism of these decisions, are the cold war.

I think that the overwhelming majority of the representatives here have understood our statement correctly. Its purpose is to clear away as quickly as possible all the obstructions which have been erected in the way to agreement on these issues. As for President Kennedy's speech, we have already given our appraisal of some of the proposition contained in it. I think that we shall repeatedly have occasion to refer to it and to quote from it, because in it -- I should like to note once more -- there is much that is valuable, much that is useful, much that we can only welcome. But we expect, we are entitled to demand, and the whole of mankind expects, that this speech will be followed by deeds; and when we meet with deeds which we welcome and which correspond with the ideas and thoughts expressed by President Kennedy, you will meet with full support and co-operation on the part of the Soviet Union.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I should merely like to say how warmly I welcome the closing words of Mr. Tsarapkin's last intervention. The United States hopes that the time will come when we shall move forward in both word and deed with the Soviet delegation.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and forty-fourth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, Italy and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 17 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.